Recent results in complexity theory suggest that various economic theories require agents to solve computationally intractable problems. However, such results assume the agents are optimizing explicit utility functions, whereas the economic theories merely assume the agents behave rationally, where rational behavior is defined via some optimization problem. Might making rational choices be easier than solving the corresponding optimization problem? For at least one major economic theory, the theory of the consumer (which simply postulates that consumers are utility maximizing), we find this is indeed the case. In other words, we prove the possibly surprising result that computational constraints have no empirical consequences for consumer choice theory.
INTRODUCTION
Questions related to the computational complexity of economic models have been a driving force inspiring research at the intersection of computer science and economics. Over the last decade, many Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. EC'11, June 5-9, 2011, San Jose, California, USA. Copyright 2011 ACM 978-1-4503-0261-6/11/06 ...$10.00. traditional economic models have been examined with the goal of understanding the computational requirements placed on the agents involved. For many models, this question has now been (partially) resolved.
For example computing Nash equilibria is now known to be hard [13, 15] even for 2-player games [11] , modulo reasonable complexity-theoretic assumptions 1 . Similarly, computing Walrasian equilibria in instances where agents have utilities that are separable over the goods and concave piecewise linear for each good is also hard [10, 35] , specifically, PPAD-complete. On the positive side, it is known how to compute Walrasian equilibria in polynomial time if all agents have linear utility functions [20, 36] . Still other results concern the complexity of the problems faced by individual agents within the market, such as a seller seeking profit-maximizing envyfree prices [19] , or a seller seeking profit-maximizing prices when facing a collection of customers with known utility functions [3] . Both of those problems are NP-hard. From the buyers' perspective, problems as basic as maximizing utility under a budget constraint are NP-hard [18] .
Computer scientists have often cited results such as those mentioned above as strong critiques of the applicability of classic economic models, claiming, for example:
"If an equilibrium is not efficiently computable, much of its credibility as a prediction of the behavior of rational agents is lost" -Christos Papadimitriou [25] "If your laptop cannot find it, neither can the market" -quote attributed to Kamal Jain [25] The critique amounts to a claim that either these computationallyhard models should be rejected, or that some suitable justification must be found for keeping them in spite of their worst-case hardness, e.g., by discovering some additional structure in real-world markets which allows computationally-bounded agents to behave in a manner consistent with them.
Economists have, in general, been slow to accept such critiques of these classic models. We posit that this is partially due to a differing view of the purpose of economic models, which leads to a contrasting notion of how computational issues should be incorporated. In particular, to an economist, models provide tools for thinking about reality; that is, about data. Thus, economic models/theories provide 'as-if' tools: economists postulate a model, and claim the observable variables behave as if the model were true. More specifically, given data from an observed phenomenon, we want to know if the theory can explain the data, i.e., if the data is consistent with an instance of the theory. If it is inconsistent, then the theory is refuted.
This differing view does not eliminate the need to consider computational issues in the model, it simply motivates a different, complementary approach for studying computational complexity. Specifically, the model still loses credibility if the agents must solve computationally hard problems; however, worst-case complexity is no longer the relevant concept. Instead, the question is whether data from an observed phenomenon can always be explained by the theory with the additional constraint that agents not be required to solve computationally hard problems, i.e., whether the data is consistent with an instance of the theory where the agents perform only computationally easy tasks. Note, of course, that this may be true even when the model is computationally hard in a worst-case sense.
This new perspective on computational complexity is strongly motivated by the revealed preference literature in economics [29] . This literature seeks to understand the empirical implications of economic models: given data from an observed phenomenon, the task is to understand how generally a model is applicable (i.e., how large the class of explainable data is) and to determine what instance of the theory is revealed by the data (e.g., to determine the properties of the utility functions that are consistent with the data). Examples of such results include [1, 2, 32, 33, 24, 7, 6, 14, 8, 9] . Hal Varian [34] has an excellent survey of revealed preference theory.
Revealed preference theory, however, traditionally disregards computational issues. Our proposed perspective on complexity changes this by adding to revealed preference theory the constraint that the instance revealed does not require agents to solve any computationally hard problems. Thus, the question becomes: does the addition of computational constraints limit the class of data explainable by the theory? Or, more colloquially, do computational constraints have empirical consequences for economic models?
The goal of this paper is to formalize this "revealed preference view" of computational complexity, and to begin to explore whether it leads to different conclusions than the standard "worst-case view." To this end, we study a classic economic model: consumer choice theory.
Consumer choice theory involves ideas that are familiar and important to both the computer science and economics communities: the theory is the basic building block of economics. Its central postulate is that consumers are utility maximizing, and yet the very task of utility maximization can be seen to be NP-hard as an immediate consequence of classical results in computer science. For consumer choice theory, the case made above-that the theory is flawed because it assumes that agents solve hard problems-is very natural, and easy to understand. A recent presentation of this view of consumer choice theory is in [18] ; but the case has been presented (albeit informally) many times before, e.g., in [31] . 2 In this paper, we shall present a different view, based on the revealed preference approach to consumer choice theory.
The specific model we consider (Section 2) is that of a single consumer who, when presented with a budget and prices for d goods, must decide on a consumption bundle. It is not difficult to see that, in this model, utility-maximizing consumers must solve a generalization of the knapsack problem, and thus, in a worst-case sense, the model requires consumers to solve an NP-hard problem. However, when the model is considered using the "revealed preference view" of computational complexity the conclusion is different. We prove that, given data for the observed behavior of a consumer, the data either corresponds to irrational behavior (it cannot be reconciled with the optimization of any utility function) or it can be explained using tractable utility functions, i.e., those that are computationally easy to maximize subject to a budget constraint. Thus, if there exist utility functions that explain the data, then there exists a tractable utility function that explains the data. In other words, the constraint that the consumer's utility function is tractable does not alter the range of consumer behavior that may be explained by the theory. So, for this model, computational constraints have no empirical consequences-despite the fact that the underlying problems the agents must solve are NP-hard in the worst-case.
As an application of our results on consumer choice, we study Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium theory (Section 3). The specific model we consider is that of an exchange economy with d goods and m utility-maximizing agents, each having an endowment and a utility function. A simple extension to the results for the consumer choice model described above shows that: given a data set including observations of prices and allocations of goods to agents, either the data corresponds to behavior that is manifestly irrational or the data can be explained using utility functions that are computationally easy to maximize and that explain the market behavior. So, again, for this model, computational constraints have no empirical consequences. We should stress, however, that the results for Walrasian equilibrium do not address the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium. We only focus on the complexity of the agents' maximization problem.
In both economic models considered in this paper, agents must perform computations that are hard in the worst-case sense. An "economist's view," however, of computational complexity shows that computational constraints do not limit the applicability of the economic models any further than the assumption of rationality does already. This provides a stark contrast to the message from the worst-case computational complexity studies of these models.
We emphasize that this paper considers only two basic models, and an important goal for further research is to understand whether similar results hold for other classic economic models such as Nash equilibrium, or for the problem of finding an equilibrium in a competitive market. Toward this end, in Section 4, we present a general formulation of the revealed preference view of computational complexity which provides a framework for approaching the analysis of other economic theories.
CONSUMER CHOICE THEORY
The revealed preference approach we propose is widely applicable, but consumer choice theory is a natural starting point since the theory is computationally hard and a basic building block for most of economics. It is the first topic covered in every introductory course in economics, and it remains a very active research field until this day -active in both empirical and theoretical research. Further, the revealed preference approach in economics was first proposed and developed for consumer choice theory.
Before introducing the model formally, we introduce some notation that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. For integer n, we let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let Z+ and R+ denote the nonnegative integers and real numbers, respectively, and let Z++ and R++ and denote the set of positive integers and real numbers, respectively. For a binary relation R, we let R * denote its transitive closure. A binary relation R is acyclic if x R * y and y R * x implies that x = y. All logarithms are base 2 unless otherwise noted. We denote a d-dimensional vector with all coordinates equal to c by c and denote the i th basis vector, which is one at coordinate i and zero at the other d − 1 coordinates, byêi.
We can now define the consumer choice problem as follows. We wish to consider the case of a single consumer and d different goods. However, to model a variable number of goods, we instead consider the case in which there are (countably) infinitely many different goods, of which the consumer only has the opportunity to purchase up to d different types of goods 3 , which we relabel as goods 1, 2, . . . , d. Formally, a d-dimensional consumption bundle is a vector x ∈ R d + , where xi indicates the amount of good i consumed, and X d is the consumption space consisting of all valid d-dimensional consumption bundles. We define the full consumption space as X := d≥0 X d . We consider two settings for the consumption space: (i) infinitely divisible goods and (ii) indivisible goods. In the case of infinitely divisible goods, each of the goods is available in perfectly divisible quantities, and so
In the case of indivisible goods, the goods can not be divided, and thus
In either case, we denote by ≤ the natural partial order on
). An instance of the consumer choice problem is specified by a price vector p ∈ R 
to determine what consumption bundle to select when faced with prices p and budget b.
To incorporate computational considerations, we make the distinction between tractable and intractable utility functions, using the standard demarcation of polynomial-time computability.
DEFINITION 1 (TRACTABLE UTILITY FUNCTIONS).
A utility function u : X → R is tractable if and only if problem (1) can be solved for all p and b in polynomial time 4 , by which we mean polynomial in d = dim(p), maxi (log pi), and log b. Otherwise, u is said to be intractable.
Infinitely divisible goods
We first discuss the case of infinitely divisible goods, which serves as a simple motivational example for the idea of a "revealed preference" view of computational complexity.
In the case of divisible goods, the consumption space is
Thus, the standard economic theory of the consumer postulates that the consumer behaves (i.e. chooses x) as if solving the problem
when faced with a price vector p ∈ R d ++ and a budget of b ∈ R+. We examine this model according to a worst-case view of computational complexity and a revealed preference view of computational complexity.
A worst-case view
From a worst-case perspective, it is immediately clear that if the utility function is allowed to be general, the consumer could be required to solve an arbitrary non-convex optimization, which is computationally intractable. (For completeness, we prove this rather basic fact for monotone utilities in Lemma 16 in Appendix B. A similar result is in [18] .) Thus, without additional assumptions on the allowable utility functions, a worst-case view of computational complexity leads to a critique of the model as unrealistically assuming that consumers are solving a problem that is not computationally tractable. Taking a revealed preference view of computational complexity will lead to a different conclusion.
A revealed preference view
At its core, our revealed preference view is an empirical approach to computational complexity; thus it starts from data about observed behavior. Specifically, suppose that we have finitely many observations of the purchases made by a consumer at prices p i and incomes
. We say that the data is rationalizable if there is a monotone increasing function u(·) such that x i is the solution to (2) at prices p i and income b i . Then, revealed preference theory provides the following well-known result [1, 32] , which says that the data results either from a consumer that is manifestly irrational or from a consumer whose behavior can be explained using a concave utility function: THEOREM 2. (Afriat's Theorem) In the consumer choice problem with infinitely divisible goods, the data (
is rationalizable if and only if it is rationalizable by a monotone increasing, piecewise linear, and concave utility function. Though Afriat's Theorem does not explicitly address computational constraints, there exist computationally efficient approaches to solving continuous monotone concave maximization problems with convex feasible sets [5] . Thus, an immediate consequence of Afriat's Theorem is that a data set (
is either manifestly irrational or can be explained using a utility function for which it is computationally efficient to solve (2) . So, in the case where goods are infinitely divisible, the constraint that consumers can solve (2) in a computationally efficient manner has no empirical consequences, since it does not impose any additional restriction on the applicability of the model beyond the restrictions imposed by the assumption of rationality. Note that a consumer has no need to find the utility function guaranteed by Afriat's Theorem using the data, since consumers are presumed to know their own preferences. This is in contrast to an empirical economist who is attempting to learn about a consumer's preferences from the data; for the latter, there are efficient algorithms to generate and evaluate the promised utility function, though this is not the focus of our current investigation.
Relating the worst-case and revealed preference views
The simple motivational example of infinitely divisible goods provides an illustration of the contrast between the worst-case and revealed preference views. This example highlights that the two views can lead to fundamentally different conclusions about the role of computation. However, observe that if an economic model is polynomial time computable in a worst-case sense, then it is immediate to see that computational restrictions will have no empirical consequences in the revealed preference view. So, the revealed preference view is weaker than the worst-case view.
The revealed preference view is weaker because the power of an adversary to choose a hard instance is limited. Instead of being able to specify a hard instance precisely (e.g., specify a hard utility function for the consumer), the instance must be specified via a data set. Since this interface is not precise, even if hard instances exist, they may not have empirical consequences in the revealed preference view if a data set specified by a hard instance can always be explained by an easy instance (e.g., all data sets are rationalizable via a monotone, concave utility function).
Indivisible goods
We now move to the computationally more interesting case of indivisible goods, i.e.,
It is a realistic case, as many consumption goods are clearly indivisible. The standard economic theory of the consumer postulates that the consumer behaves (i.e., chooses x) as if solving the problem
when faced with a price vector p ∈ R d ++ and a budget of b ∈ R+. The analysis in this setting is significantly more involved than that for infinitely divisible goods. The main result, however, will be the same: that the consumer problem is computationally hard in a worst-case sense, but that computational constraints have no empirical consequences in the revealed preference view.
A worst-case view
As in the case of infinitely divisible goods, it is immediately clear that if the utility function is allowed to be general, the consumer could be required to solve an arbitrary discrete optimization, which is computationally intractable. In fact, optimization over a discrete space is intractable for seemingly simple utility functions: we show in Lemma 16 that solving (3) is NP-hard, even with linear utility functions. Thus, without additional assumptions on the allowable utility functions, a worst-case view of computational complexity leads to a critique of the model as unrealistically assuming that consumers are solving a problem that is not computationally tractable.
A revealed preference view
We now switch to a revealed preference view of computational complexity. As in the case of infinitely divisible goods, it provides a very different perspective than the worst-case view.
To define the revealed preference view, we must first define the form of the observed data about consumer behavior. We model the data (input) as a sequence of some number n of consumer
where
+ is the consumer choice observed under prices p i and budget b i (i.e., under budget set
; that is, a consumer with no money chooses the only feasible choice, namely nothing at all. 5 Adopting the language of revealed preference theory, we let X = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n be the set of bundles purchased at any time in the input and observe that the data induces a revealed preference relation
The assumption is purely technical, and does not interfere with the rationalizability of the data.
As in the case of infinitely divisible goods, we say that the data
is rationalizable if there is a monotone increasing function u(·) such that
Now, as in the case of indivisible goods, revealed preference theory provides a characterization of the set of data that is rationalizable. Specifically, the following well-known result (see, for example, [26] or [27] ) highlights the relationship between rationalizability and the preference relation R0: THEOREM 3. In the consumer choice problem with indivisible goods, data (
is rationalizable if and only if the binary relation R0 is acyclic.
There are results analogous to Theorem 2 for infinitely divisible goods. The following result is due to [8] (and extended by [30] ). Of course, concave utility is not appropriate in the indivisible case, but supermodularity and submodularity are useful properties of utility one can potentially exploit. THEOREM 4. In the consumer choice problem with indivisible goods, the following statements are equivalent:
is rationalizable.
(ii) The data is rationalizable by a supermodular utility function.
(iii) The data is rationalizable by a submodular utility function.
At this point, however, the parallel with the case of infinitely divisible good ends. Unlike in the case of infinitely divisible goods, we can not immediately apply Theorem 4 to arrive at utility functions for which it is computationally efficient for consumers to solve (3). The reason is that solving (3) for either submodular or supermodular utility functions is not computationally efficient. Specifically, submodular maximization subject to a budget constraint is NP-hard, even to approximate to better than a (1 − 1/e) factor [16] . Further, supermodular maximization subject to a budget constraint is likewise NP-hard [21] , and extremely inapproximable under reasonable complexity assumptions, as we show in Theorem 17.
The main result of this paper is that, when data is rationalizable, it is possible to rationalize the data using a utility function for which solving (3) is computationally efficient. Specifically: THEOREM 5. In the consumer choice problem with indivisible goods, data (
is rationalizable if and only if it is rationalizable via a tractable monotone utility function.
The message in Theorem 5 is that computational constraints do not impose any further restrictions on the ability of consumer choice theory to explain data than are already imposed by the assumption of rationality. This is in stark contrast to the message suggested by the worst-case view of computational complexity for this model.
In order to prove Theorem 5, we must prove that the data is either not rationalizable, or there is a utility function rationalizing the data such that for any p and b, (3) can be solved in strongly polynomial time. That is, using only computation time polynomial in n, d, and the number of bits required to write down the prices and budgets.
We cannot use Theorem 4 to prove Theorem 5. Instead, we proceed by working with the demand function instead of the utility function. Specifically, to prove the result we construct an efficient algorithm
to compute a demand function 
n], and (ii) there is a monotone increasing utility function u(·) rationalizing the data, and for all p ∈ R d ++ and b ∈ R+ we have ψ(p, b) = arg max {u(x) : x ∈ B(p, b)} . 7 We prove this fact as Corollary 15 in Appendix A. Interestingly, the algorithm does not explicitly construct a tractable utility function; rather, a utility function is implicit in the demand function which our algorithm computes.
In the remainder of this section, we explain the algorithm for computing a demand function from the data. It consists of two steps: (i) A preprocessing phase, A.preprocess, in which a ranking r on X = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n is computed.
(ii) A core phase, A.evaluate_demand, that uses the ranking in order to evaluate the demand function ψ(p, b). Let lex max S denote the lexicographically maximum element of S. We provide pseudocode below.
Let E0 := (x, y) ∈ X 2 : x = y, x ≤ y be the transitive closure of the lattice poset restricted to elements of X; Let E := E0 ∪ R0, and define a directed graph G := (X, E); Perform a topological sort of G to get vertex ordering π; Output r : X → Z++ defined such that r(x) = i iff x is the i th element according to π; end 
A first remark on Algorithm A is that, if we envision adding data points to a given data set, the algorithm will 'learn' or approximate a limiting demand function, e.g., see [23] . This learning perspective on the algorithm is not the goal of the current work, but is interesting in its own right. See [4] for another example of a learning approach in this context. For the purpose of this paper, we simply note that if one looks at the design of A from a learning perspective, the use of lex max in A.evaluate_demand is artificial. Many other choices are possible, e.g., one could parameterize the algorithm with prior beliefs about consumer demand to select among them. 7 Note the divergence from the more classical approach in revealed preference theory; e.g [1, 32, 8] . Most studies of revealed preference construct a rationalizing utility. Here the approach is to construct a demand function, and then show that it is rationalizable.
We defer the proof of the correctness of Algorithm A to Appendix A and discuss only the running time of the algorithm here. It is immediate to see that phase (ii), A.evaluate_demand, can be implemented in O(nd) time. Phase (i), A.preprocess, can be implemented in O n 2 d time, since we may iterate over X 2 , and test if each element belongs to E0 ∪ R0 in O(d) time, and topological sort is well-known to have a linear-time implementation, i.e., one taking O(|X| + |E|) time, which is this case amounts to O n 2 .
The total time is thus O n 2 d . One, possibly surprising, observation about the running time of algorithm A is that it depends on n, the size of the data set. One may reasonably take n to be a constant when evaluating the running time of the demand function ψ since it is the tractability with respect to p and b that is relevant when the choice function is evaluated for future demands (i.e., the data set is fixed for all future evaluations of the demand function). However, one may also reasonably ask whether the dependence of the running time on n is necessary or if it is an artifact of specific algorithm presented here.
It turns out that there is an unavoidable dependence of any rationalization algorithm on the size of the data in (at least) two ways. First, when determining a demand function to rationalize the data, the algorithm must process every 'distinct' element of the data set, which highlights that the running time must be at least the size of the minimal representation of the data set. Second, the resulting demand function must at least encode each entry of the data set. Thus, the space needed to represent the demand function must also be bounded below by the size of the minimal representation of the data set. More formally, we can prove the following lower bounds on the running time of any algorithm for rationalizing the data set and for the space needed to represent the resulting demand function. The proofs are deferred to Appendix C. PROPOSITION 6. Any algorithm that takes as input a data set with n data points, a price vector p, and a budget b and outputs ψ(p, b) for a ψ which rationalizes the data set requires, in the worst case, Ω(n) running time on a RAM with word size Θ(log n), even when there are only two goods.
PROPOSITION 7.
Any demand function ψ that rationalizes a data set with n data points requires Ω(n log n) bits of space to represent, in the worst case, even when there are only two goods.
These two propositions highlight that the dependence of the running time on the size of the data set is unavoidable. However, observe that the running time of algorithm A does not match the lower bound above, since it has a quadratic dependence on n. On the other hand, our preprocessing step is space-optimal, since it can be implemented using linear space by performing the topological sort in a lazy manner that generates the adjacently list of each vertex of G on the fly, and hence avoids the need to explicitly construct G. The running time of this lazy implementation is also O(n 2 d).
WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
The theory of the consumer is an important component in many economic theories. The most important of these is general equilibrium theory, which in turn is the most widely applied model in mainstream micro economics (it underlines most of modern macro economics, international trade and financial economics). In this section, we present the implications of our results on consumer choice theory for general equilibrium theory, specifically the implications for the empirical content of Walrasian equilibrium as formulated by [6] .
The basic model of general equilibrium assumes a finite number of goods and agents. Agents have preferences and are endowed with initial quantities of the goods. (We ignore production in our discussion.) The theory predicts which prices will emerge for the different goods, and what the quantities of the goods consumed by the agents will be. Specifically, the theory predicts that the prices and quantities conform to a Walrasian equilibrium: a situation where agents choose quantities optimally given prices, endowments, and the incomes derived from selling their endowments; and where supply equals demand for all goods simultaneously.
We can describe the revealed preference formulation of Walrasian equilibrium as follows [6] . Given data on prices and resources for an economy, we want to know if the data are rationalizable as Walrasian equilibrium outcomes. The rationalization involves specifying utility functions for the agents. We want to study if these utility functions can be chosen so that they are tractable.
Consider the standard model of an exchange economy. Suppose there are d goods and m agents. Each agent i is described by a consumption space X 
is an allocation and p ∈ R d ++ is a price vector such that, for all i, xi solves the problem
We assume that we have data on prices, incomes and resources. Specifically, a data set is a collection (p
. We follow [6] in assuming that individual consumption vectors are not observable. We say that a data set is rationalizable if there are utility functions ui for each agent, and vectors
Given the above setup, the results in Section 2 imply that in the case of indivisible goods (i.e., when
is either not rationalizable, or it is rationalizable using tractable ui for all agents: utilities such that the problems
can be solved in strongly polynomial time. Further, from the discussion in Section 2 it is easy to see that a similar result holds for infinitely divisible goods (i.e., X
as a consequence of Afriat's Theorem. The key observation necessary to obtain these results is that the assumption that the market must clear (i.e., supply must match demand) does not impose any additional constraints on the problems solved by the agents.
However, it is important to realize that our results do not address the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibria. We have limited the discussion to the individual consumer's problem, not the collective problem of finding an equilibrium. The later question is clearly important and interesting, and it is a focus of continuing work on this topic. The exact formulation of the revealed preference view for this extension is a special case of the general formulation that we introduce in Section 4.
A GENERAL FORMULATION
In this paper we focus on one particular theory, consumer choice theory; however it is clear that the revealed preference view of com-putational complexity can be studied much more broadly. In this section we present a general formulation of the revealed preference view which can be applied, for example, to test the impact of computational constraints on the empirical content of the theory of Nash equilibrium, the theory of stable matchings, and other economic theories.
To begin the general formulation, let I be a set of possible inputs, and O be a set of possible outputs. For example, in consumer theory, I is the set of all price-budget pairs (p, b), while O is the consumption space (X d ). We represent a theory as a collection G = {gτ : τ ∈ T } of correspondences, gτ ⊆ I × O, which we index by a set T for convenience. For example, consumer choice theory is the collection {ψu : u ∈ U } where U is the set of all monotone increasing utility functions u : X d → R and ψu(p, b) is the demand function obtained from maximizing u over the budget set defined by (p, b).
Classical revealed preference theory
When taking a revealed preference perspective on a theory, the goal is to test the theory using data. We define a data set D as a finite
of pairs of inputs and outputs. The set of all possible data sets is D = (I × O) * , i.e., all finite sequences of pairs in I × O.
A data set
is rationalizable by the theory G = {gτ :
In that case, we say that gτ rationalizes the data.
Further, we define a rationalization rule r : D → (I → O) such that for each rationalizable data set D, r(D) = gτ for some τ ∈ T such that gτ rationalizes the data.
Finally, define the set of data sets rationalizable by theory G as RG = {D ∈ D : ∃τ ∈ T : gτ rationalizes D}.
Given this setup, some classic revealed preference questions are:
Is theory G refutable, i.e., Is RG D? Is data D rationalizable by theory G, i.e., Is D ∈ RG?
However, these classic questions ignore computational constraints on the theory.
Adding computational constraints
Our revealed preference view of computational complexity can be fit into the above framework as follows. Consider again the rationalization rule r : D → (I → O). We now seek to understand the impact of imposing an additional constraint on r(D) = gτ which rationalizes D -it must be "tractable." Formally, we say that gτ (i) = [r(D)](i) is tractable if it is computable in time polynomial in the size of both D and i. We require it to be polynomial in the size of D for reasons discussed below (and in Section 2).
Define the set of data sets that are rationalizable using tractable instances of theory G as EG = {D ∈ D : ∃τ ∈ T . gτ rationalizes D and gτ is tractable }.
Given this framework, the general version of the question posed by the revealed preference view of complexity is: Do computational constraints have empirical consequences, i.e., Is EG RG?
In general, the set EG constitutes a test for the joint hypotheses of assuming the economic theory G, and requiring that the economic system not solve unrealistically hard problems. If EG RG then one would seek to characterize EG so that actual tests of the joint hypotheses can be carried out.
One final remark about this formulation is that it may initially seem strange that the computational time of gτ depends on size of D, but, as we saw in the case of consumer choice theory, this is necessary in order to ensure that gτ rationalizes D.
In fact, we can generalize Propositions 6 and 7 for this general formulation as follows. For a theory G, define
to be the set of rationalizable data sets on input sequence {i k } n k=1 . Then we have the following lower bounds on the running time of r and space required to represent gτ ∈ G. The proofs are deferred to Appendix C.
in the worst case on a RAM with wordsize Θ(log n), where the max is taken over all input sequences {i k } n k=1 of length n. PROPOSITION 9. Fix a theory G and n ∈ N. The space required to represent any gτ ∈ G rationalizing a rationalizable data set of size n is at least max (i 1 ,...,in) log 2 |RG {i k } n k=1 | bits in the worst case, where the max is taken over all input sequences {i k } n k=1
of length n.
These propositions highlight that there is an explicit tradeoff between the generality of the theory being tested and the running time of r and the space complexity of gτ . The generality of the theory is measured by the quantity max (i 1 ,...,in) |RG {i k } n k=1 |, which captures the notation that a more general theory can explain (rationalize) a larger class of data sets.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The core idea presented by this paper is that there is a philosophical difference in how many computer scientists and economists view economic models, and that the lack of broad acceptance of worst-case complexity results in economics stems partially from the difference between these viewpoints. We posit that while computer scientists tend to think 'algorithmically' about economic models, economists tend to think 'empirically' about the models.
In particular, an algorithmic view of the model assumes the model is fixed and literally true, and then proceeds to ask about the demands placed on the agents by the model. That is, it assumes that the agent is simply an implementation of the model and asks whether the agent can efficiently compute its decisions.
In contrast, an empirical view of the model takes the model as a tool for thinking about reality. One does not presume agents literally follow the model, only that the model provides a way to explain the observed behavior, i.e., the data. Thus, an empirical view of economic models is that they provide 'as-if' tools: one postulates a model and claims the observable variables behave as if the model is true.
Note that the empirical view does not deny that computational issues should be studied. To the contrary, a model still loses credibility if the agents must solve computationally hard problems; however, worst-case complexity is no longer the relevant concept. Instead, the question is whether data from an observed phenomenon can always be explained by the theory under the additional constraint that agents are not required to solve computationally hard problems.
This paper presents a formulation of how to incorporate computational information into the empirical view; however the algorithmic view continues to be very important. Many problems require the design of automated agents who participate in various economic interactions: in this case explicit utility functions are provided by the designer, and are obviously not theoretical unknowns. Using classical economic jargon, one could say that the algorithmic view is relevant for normative economics while the empirical view is relevant for positive economics.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS FOR THE CONSUMER CHOICE MODEL
In this section we prove Theorem 5 via a sequence of lemmas culminating in Theorem 14 and Corollary 15.
LEMMA 10. If R0 is acyclic, then := (R0 ∪ ≤) * is acyclic.
PROOF. The proof follows from the definition of budget set. Here, we use the convention that x R0 y is the same as (x, y) ∈ R0, meaning x is revealed-preferred to y. Now suppose by way of contradiction that R0 is acyclic, but contains a minimal cycle C. Since ≤ is transitive, any minimal cycle consists only of edges in X 2 (recall X is the set of consumption bundles observed in the data plus the zero lattice point). Otherwise C contains edges (x, y) and (y, z) for some y / ∈ X. Since these pairs cannot be in R0, we have x ≤ y and y ≤ z. Hence x ≤ z and we can replace (x, y) and (y, z) with (x, z), which violates the minimality of C.
Since R0 is acyclic by assumption, C must contain an edge (x, y) / ∈ R0. Because (x, y) ∈ (R0 ∪ ≤) * by assumption, this means x ≤ y. However, since x, y ∈ X from our earlier argument, and because the budget sets are downward-closed with respect to ≤, x ≤ y implies (x, y) ∈ R0 by definition of R0. This contradictions our earlier assumption that (x, y) / ∈ R0. Hence no minimal cycle exists, and is acyclic. LEMMA 12. Let r be the ranking computed during preproccessing. Let := (R0 ∪ ≤) * and assume R0 is acyclic. Fix x, y ∈ X. Then ranks are distinct, i.e., x = y implies r(x) = r(y), and the ranks are monotone in , i.e., x y implies r(x) ≤ r(y).
PROOF. The first part, x = y implies r(x) = r(y), holds by construction since r(·) is the rank within a permutation π and no two elements have the same rank. Now suppose x y. Then by definition of there is a path P in (R0 ∪ ≤)
* from x to y. We claim there must be a path P from x to y in the digraph G = (X, E) constructed during preproccessing, since (i) all the edges in R0 are present in E, and (ii) every maximal subpath of P starting and ending at lattice points in X and consisting only of edges in ≤ can be traversed by a single edge in E0 by the transitivity of ≤, and E0 ⊆ E, and (iii) P can be decomposed into edges in R0 and maximal subpaths of P starting and ending at lattice points in X. Hence there is a path in G from x to y and so the topological sort must place x before y in π, which implies r(x) ≤ r(y). (Note that since R0 is acyclic by assumption, is acyclic by Lemma 10, which in turn implies G is acyclic, and thus there exists a topological ordering of its vertices.) LEMMA 13. Assume that R0 is acyclic. The choice function ψ computed by A explains the data, i.e., ψ(p
PROOF. Fix i ∈ [n] arbitrarily. Recall B i is the budget set faced by the consumer when x i was chosen. Note x i ∈ B i ∩ X, so it is considered in the arg max in the computation of z(p i , b i ). We consider two cases, namely z(
, as x i is a maximal element of the budget set with respect to the lattice ordering ≤, and hence the evaluation of the lex max in the computation of x(p i , b i ) is over the singleton set x i , and so the output of A is
We next argue that the second case cannot occur. Suppose by way of contradiction that z(p i , b i ) = x i . Then there must be some x j = x i such that r(x i ) < r(x j ) and x j ∈ B i , by the definition of z(p i , b i ). However, the fact that x j ∈ B i and x i was chosen in the i th observation implies (x j , x i ) ∈ R0 and hence x j x i , where := (R0 ∪ ≤) * as before. Lemma 12 then implies r(x j ) ≤ r(x i ), contradicting our earlier deduction that r(x i ) < r(x j ).
We now introduce R ψ , the preference relation revealed by ψ(·):
THEOREM 14. Algorithm A computes a choice function ψ such that if R ψ is the preference relation revealed by ψ and R0 is acyclic, then ψ explains the data and (R ψ ∪ ≤) * is acyclic.
PROOF. We prove ψ explains the input in Lemma 13. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that R0 is acyclic and yet there is a minimal cycle C in the induced binary relation (R ψ ∪ ≤)
* . Note that is acyclic by Lemma 10. Suppose that C consists of k edges (
where we define y k+1 := y 1 for convenience. We can suppose that each edge (y i , y i+1 ) is in R ψ ; the proof of this fact is similar to the proof of Lemma 10. Let p(y i ) and b(y i ) denote the prices and budget corresponding to the choice of
) be the intermediate lattice point computed when running A with input (p(y i ), b(y i )) and the ranking r(·). We consider two cases, namely z i = z j for all i, j ∈ [k], or there exists i, j with z i = z j . We start with the case that z i = z j for all i, j ∈ [k]. By construction,
for all i. Since (y i , y i+1 ) ∈ C, we know y i ∈ B(y i+1 ), i.e., y i is affordable for the budget set for which the consumer purchases y i+1 . Since z i = z i+1 , this implies y i is in the set over which the algorithm computes the lex max when running on input (p(y i+1 ), b(y i+1 )), namely x : x ∈ B(y i+1 ), z i+1 ≤ x .
Since y i+1 was selected, y i is lexicographically less than or equal to y i+1 , which we denote by y i ≤Lex y i+1 . Since i was arbitrary, y 1 ≤Lex y 2 ≤Lex · · · ≤Lex y k ≤Lex y k+1 = y 1 .
Since lexicographic order is a partial order, we infer y 1 = y 2 = · · · = y k , contradicting the assumption that C is a cycle. Moving on to the second case, suppose there exists i, j with z i = z j . Then there exists i ∈ [k] with z i = z i+1 . Recall that since (y i , y i+1 ) ∈ C, y i ∈ B(y i+1 ). Clearly, y i+1 ∈ B(y i+1 ). Note for all x and y such that x ≤ y, and for all prices p and budgets b, we have y ∈ B(p, b) implies x ∈ B(p, b). Since by construction z i ≤ y i and z i+1 ≤ y i+1 , we infer z i , z i+1 ∈ B(y i+1 ). From this fact, the definitions of z i and z i+1 , and the fact that distinct lattice points in X have distinct ranks (as stated in Lemma 12), we can infer r(z i ) < r(z i+1 ).
Of course, for any j, if z j = z j+1 then r(z j ) = r(z j+1 ). Hence for all j ∈ [k], either r(z j ) = r(z j+1 ) or r(z j ) < r(z j+1 ), so that for all j ∈ [k], r(z j ) ≤ r(z j+1 ), and moreover there is at least one strict inequality: r(z i ) < r(z i+1 ). Altogether these facts yield r(z 1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ r(z i ) < r(z i+1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ r(z k+1 ) = r(z 1 )
contradicting the well-ordering of ≤ for Z++.
is rationalizable if and only if algorithm A computes a demand function ψ such that ψ explains the data and is generated by a monotone utility function.
PROOF. By Theorem 3, Lemma 10, and Theorem 14, a data
is rationalizable if and only if the constructed ψ is such that (R ψ ∪ ≤) * is acyclic. Acyclicity implies (by a version of Szpilrajn's lemma) that (R ψ ∪ ≤)
* has an extension to Z d + . Since Z d + is countable, the extension trivially satisfies the standard order-denseness condition for a utility representation. The utility representation rationalizes ψ by definition of R ψ ; and it is monotone because it represents an extension of ≤.
B. HARDNESS PROOFS
In this section we prove various hardness and inapproximability results cited in Section 2. These results show that the consumer is faced with solving an intractable problem according to a worst-case view of computational complexity in the consumer choice model. These results are not surprising or difficult but are included for completeness of presentation.
We start by proving the hardness of maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint under monotone utility functions. LEMMA 16. Maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint is NP-hard for monotone utility functions, both for divisible and indivisible goods.
PROOF. For indivisible goods, the problem is NP-hard even for linear utility functions, since the problem arg max {u · x : p · x ≤ b, x ∈ Z+} is precisely the UNBOUNDED KNAPSACK problem, a classic NPhard problem [17] .
For divisible goods, we may fix arbitrary nonnegative constants v1, . . . , v d and define the utility function as u(x) = d i=1 vi1{xi ≥ 1}, where 1{P } is the indicator variable for predicate P , i.e., 1{P } = 1 if P is true, and 1{P } = 0 otherwise. Note u is monotone. The resulting problem, arg max {u(x) : p · x ≤ b, x ∈ R+} , is again equivalent to UNBOUNDED KNAPSACK. The less-approximable DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem can likewise be encoded: given G = (V, E) set u(x) = (u,v)∈E 1{xu ≥ 1 and xv ≥ 1}, b = k, and p = 1.
Next, We provide an inapproximability result for maximizing a monotone supermodular function f subject to a cardinality constraint. A special case of this problem called QUADRATIC KNAP-SACK has long been known to be NP-hard [21] , via a simple reduction from DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH.
Despite much effort, accurate bounds on the best approximation factor obtainable for DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH by an efficient algorithm under reasonable complexity assumptions have eluded all attempts to date. We can, however, exploit a construction due to Khot to obtain the following result.
